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A long-term whole-farm analysis compared conventional and low-input fanning systems. Data from a 
nine-year agronomic study at the Rodale Research Farm, Kutztown, Pennsylvania, were used to 
analyze profitability, liquidity, solvency, and risk on a representative commercial grain farm. 
Conventional and low-input farms participating in government programs are the most profitable 
scenarios, followed by conventional and tow-input farms not participating in government programs. 
All farms increased their net worth. The low-input approach is advantageous for risk-averse farmers 
using a safety-first criterion. 
There has been an increased interest in sustainable 
farming systems nationally. Many advocate reducing 
purchased inputs, particularly synthetic pesticides 
and inorganic fertilizers. Environmental concerns, 
health issues related to chemical residues in foods, 
and increasing costs of inputs have all contributed 
to this interest. Research has been conducted for 
several years to develop various sustainable flow-
input) farming systems. Some of these systems have 
been adopted on commercial farms, but 
information on these systems is still limited. The 
effects of low-input systems on the farm or-
ganization, farm output, and environment are also 
uncertain. Even more uncertain is the relative prof-
itability of low-input systems compared to con-
ventional farming systems. 
This topic has particular significance for Middle 
Atlantic agriculture. The close proximity of major 
population centers and watersheds for the Chesa-
peake Bay has generated pressure on agriculture to 
reduce chemical residues in surface and ground 
waters. If low-input agriculture, which emphasizes 
chemical reduction, can be shown to be profitable 
on some farms, then contamination of surface and 
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ground water may be reduced through its adoption. It 
is equally important to know why low-input ag-
riculture may not be profitable for individual farmers. 
In the 1989 publication Alternative Agriculture, 
the authors note several limitations in past efforts 
to evaluate the profitability of sustainable agricul-
ture. Partial budget studies that have been con-
ducted "focus on short-term net returns, including 
labor, and generally do not take into account off-
farm impact or long-term changes in the produc-
tivity of the natural resource base. They also as-
sume no change in farm size, enterprise 
combinations, prices of commodities or inputs, or 
other variables. Despite these limitations, this method is 
practical and easy to understand" (p. 197). Surveys, 
which compare low-input and conventional farms, 
also provide useful data but have difficulty 
delineating management ability among farmers, 
which can bias the results (p. 198). Whole-farm 
analyses often take a static approach, ignoring tran-
sitional costs that must be paid to move from con-
ventional to sustainable agriculture. The uncertainty 
caused by weather and prices is often ignored (p. 
198). In addition, the assessment of some sustain-
able systems is complicated by the lack of com-
parable data for conventional farms (p. 304). 
This paper presents a whole-farm analysis of a 
representative Mid-Atlantic commercial grain farm 
under conventional and low-input scenarios. This 
analysis covers a time span of nine years, which Hanson, Johnson, Peters, and Janke  The Profitability of Sustainable Agriculture    91 
incorporates the costs of moving from one system 
to another. Yields and input data are taken from 
the Farming Systems Experiment conducted by the 
Rodale Research Center in southern Pennsylvania 
from 1981 through 1989. In contrast to a "nor-
malized budget" and sensitivity-analysis approach 
(Dobbs, Leddy, and Smolik), actual yields, prices, 
and costs for the 1980s were used to develop spe-
cific crop budgets for each year. Income taxes and 
financial considerations such as debt refinancing 
were also included. In addition, the effects of the 
government feed grain program on the conven-
tional and low-input systems were evaluated. 
Study Background and Framework 
Rodale Research Center has been conducting a long-
term farming systems experiment since 1981 (Pe-
ters, Andrews, and Janke). Three farming systems 
based on multiyear rotations were evaluated. These 
systems include conventional cash grain, low-input 
cash grain, and low-input livestock. 
Research plots were established so that each system 
had three different entry points in the rotation, and 
each of these entry points was replicated eight 
times. Yields, input records, and other biological 
data were kept for these research plots. Published 
agronomic results of this study from 1981 through 
1985 are available (Liebhardt et al.). 
This study analyzes two of Rodale's systems— 
the conventional cash grain and the low-input cash 
grain. These two systems were expanded to four 
scenarios by looking at each system under the hy-
pothetical situation of participation in the gov-
ernment commodity programs. A representative 
commercial-sized grain farm was modeled based 
on information from the Rodale systems. A whole-
farm long-term financial analysis was conducted to 
examine the advantages and disadvantages of each 
scenario. Factors of profitability, liquidity, risk, 
and solvency were analyzed in a nine-year trend 
analysis. 
The Representative Farm 
A representative grain farm typical of those found in 
the Mid-Atlantic region was modeled. This grain 
farm had the following characteristics. The farm 
included 750 acres of tillable cropland. The ma-
chinery complement included equipment for till-
age, planting, cultivating, and spraying. Grain 
harvesting and fertilizer/lime applications were 
custom hired. The farm was managed by an owner-
operator with 250 hours of operator and family 
labor per month. Seasonal hired labor was available 
on an hourly basis. There was sufficient building 
space for machinery and hay storage. There was 
no on-farm grain storage. The farm started with a 
22% intermediate and long-term debt-to-asset ratio 
(current liabilities equal zero). Fifteen years re-
mained on the farm mortgage. 
Each of the four scenarios started with the same 
resources. Therefore, a direct comparison could be 
made as to which was the most successful over the 
nine years. The two base scenarios—conventional 
grain and low-input grain—followed the cultural 
practices and received the yields of their respective 
plots in Rodale's Farming Systems Experiment. 
These data were adapted to the corresponding sce-
narios enrolled in the government feed grain pro-
grams. The four scenarios are characterized as 
follows (Tables 1 and 2). 
1. Conventional grain farm, base scenario. This 
farm followed Rodale's five-year rotation of corn, 
corn, soybeans, corn, and soybeans. Three, 250-acre 
sections were planted in different entry points. 
Fertilizer and pesticide application rates were 
made following The Pennsylvania State 
University's recommendations given the condi-
tions at the experimental plots. This farm did not 
participate in government commodity programs. 
The existing machinery and building complements 
were sufficient to operate this farm. 
2.  Conventional grain farm participating in 
government feed grain programs, adapted sce-
nario. In this scenario, the conventional base sce-
nario rotation was adapted for the feed grain program 
for com. The Agricultural Stabilization and Con-
servation Service (ASCS) base acreage for corn 
was 500 acres. The farm complied with the acreage-
reduction requirements to receive deficiency pay-
ments. In 1985, the conventional grain farm, base 
scenario, planted 500 acres of soybeans and 250 
acres of corn. This was changed to fit the govern-
ment-program scenario of 450 acres of corn, 250 
acres of soybeans, and 50 acres of set-aside land 
in that year. Since there was no on-farm grain storage 
capacity, it did not receive loan support payments. 
No other government-program alternatives, such as 
paid land diversion or 0/92, were selected. 
3. Low-input cash grain farm, base scenario. 
This farm followed Rodale's low-input rotation of 
small grain/forage legume, corn, small 
grain/forage legume, corn, and soybeans. Three, 
250-acre sections were planted in three different 
entry points. Pesticides and inorganic fertilizers 
(except potash in 1989) were not applied to these 
crops. This farm did not participate in government 
commodity programs. Besides the basic machinery 
complement, the farm purchased forage harvesting 
equipment for $24,505 in 1981. The buildings were 
sufficient to operate this farm. 92    October 1990  NJARE 
Table 1.    Crop Acreages, by Year, for the Conventional Grain Farm, Base Scenario, and the 
Conventional Grain Farm Adapted to Participate in the Government Feed Grain Programs, 
1981-89 
Year    Field One    Field Two  Field Three   Set-Aside 
Conveiitional Cash ti Grain Farm, Base  Scenario          
1981    Com (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A)   Corn (250 A)     
1982 Corn (250 A) Com (250 A) Soybeans (250 A)
1983    Soybeans (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Corn (250 A)   
1984    Corn (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Corn (250 A)   
1985    Soybeans (250 A)    Com (250 A) Soybeans (250 A)   
1986    Corn (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Com (250 A)   
1987    Corn (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Soybeans (250 A)   
1988    Soybeans (250 A)    Corn (250 A)   Corn (250 A)     
1989    Corn (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A)   Corn (250 A)     
Conveiitional Cash Grain Farm, Government Programs         
1981    Corn (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Corn (250 A)    (OA)
1982    Corn (250 A)    Corn (200 A) Soybeans (250 A)    (50 A)
1983    Soybeans (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Corn (150 A)    (100 A)
1984    Corn (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Corn (200 A)    (50 A)
1985    Soybeans (250 A)    Com (250 A)    Corn (200 A)    (50 A)
1986    Com (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Corn (150 A)    (100 A)
1987    Corn (250 A)    Com (150 A) Soybeans (250 A)    (100 A)
1988    Soybeans (250 A)    Corn (250 A)    Corn (200 A)    (50 A)
1989    Corn (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A)   Corn (200 A)    (50 A)
Note: "A" is acres. 
Table 2.    Crop Acreages, by Year, for the Low-Input Grain Farm, Base Scenario, and the 
Low-Input Grain Farm Adapted to Participate in the Government Feed Grain Programs, 
1981-89 
Year    Field One    Field Two    Field Three    Set-Aside
Low-Input Cash Grain Farm, Base Scenario           
1981    Oats/RC (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Corn (250 A)   
1982    Corn (250 A)    Oats/RC (250 A) Soybeans (250 A)   
1983    Oats/RC (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Oats/RC (250 A)   
1984    Corn (250 A)   Wheat/RC (250 A) Corn (250 A)   
1985    Soybeans (250 A)    Com (250 A) Oats/RC (250 A)   
1986    Oats/RC (250 A)    Barley/SB (250 A) Corn (250 A)   
1987    Corn (250 A)   Wheat/RC (250 A) Wheat/SB (250 A)   
1988    Barley/SB (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Oats/RC (250 A)   
1989    Wheat/RC (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A)   Corn (250 A)     
Low-Iinput Cash Grain Farm, Government Programs         
1981    Oats/RC (250 A)    Soybeans (250 A) Corn (250 A)    (OA)
1982    Corn (250 A)    Oats/RC (205 A) Soybeans (250 A)    (45 A)
1983    Oats/RC (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Oats/RC (168 A)    (82 A)
1984    Corn (250 A)   Wheat/RC (375 A) Corn (87 A)    (38 A)
1985    Soybeans (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Oats/RC (2 15 A)    (35 A)
1986    Oats/RC (189 A)    Barley/SB (250 A) Corn (250 A)    (61 A)
1987    Corn (250 A)    Wheat/RC (186 A) Wheat/SB (250 A)    (64 A)
1988    Barley/SB (250 A)    Corn (250 A) Oats/RC (185 A)    (65 A)
1989    Wheat/RC (2 18 A)    Soybeans (250 A)   Corn (250 A)    (32 A)
Note: RC = red clover, SB = soybeans. Hanson, Johnson, Peters, and Janke 
4, Low-input cash grain farm participating in 
government feed grain programs, adapted sce-
nario. In this scenario, the low-input base scenario 
rotation was adapted for the feed grain program for 
corn. The beginning ASCS acreage was 500 acres, 
but that declined in the following years. The farm 
complied with the acreage-reduction requirements 
to receive deficiency payments. In the five years 
when wheat or barley was planted (program crops), 
cross-compliance requirements were ignored. This is 
a conflict between participating in government 
programs and practicing rotational agriculture. In 
reality, this scenario cannot be adopted. However, it 
is useful to analyze what would happen if there 
were no such restrictions. In 1984, 500 acres of 
corn and 250 acres of wheat/red clover were planted in 
the low-input cash grain farm, base scenario. This 
was changed to fit the government-program 
scenario of 337 acres of corn, 375 acres of wheat/ 
red clover, and 38 acres of set-aside. Since there 
was no on-farm grain storage capacity, it did not 
receive loan support payments. No other govern-
ment-program alternatives, such as paid land di-
version or 0/92, were selected. This farm also 
purchased forage harvesting equipment. 
The Analysis Methodology 
This financial analysis simulates what would have 
happened over the 1981-89 period if a represen-
tative farm with the characteristics described had 
followed each of the four scenarios. The following 
financial procedures were used for each of the four 
scenarios: 
1. Crop enterprise budgets were developed. Ro-
dale's farming-systems inputs and cultural prac-
tices from the different rotations were adapted to 
fit the 750-acre farm. Between 1982 and 1989, 
Rodale's replicated plot yields were reduced by 
20% to better approximate yields on larger com-
mercial farms. In 1981, 100% of plot yields were 
used because of the initial problems associated with 
establishing the trial that year. Budgets were de-
veloped that were based on Rodale's input and 
output quantities each year. For the respective years, 
actual input and output prices from central Mary-
land were used. Central Maryland prices are similar 
to southern Pennsylvania prices, 
2. Crop enterprise budgets were summarized in 
annual income statements. 
3. Balance sheets were developed. Assets on the 
balance sheets were developed based on the farm 
characteristics discussed earlier. Liabilities were 
assessed to reflect a typical Mid-Atlantic commercial 
grain farm operation of this size. 
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4. A financial trend analysis was developed for 
1981 to 1989. The income statements and balance 
sheets were combined in a yearly financial sum-
mary using the FINAN component of FINPACK, a 
computerized farm financial and analysis program 
developed at the University of Minnesota. This 
package provides profitability, solvency, and li-
quidity analysis. Profits and losses are carried over 
from year to year on the income statements and 
balance sheets to provide a trend analysis for the 
entire time period. 
5. Miscellaneous, necessary assumptions were 
made regarding such issues as machinery and 
buildings purchases, labor, repairs, income taxes, 
real estate taxes, and interest computations. The 
authors presented preliminary results of this study to 
groups of farmers and researchers (in excess of 500 
individuals) in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New 
Jersey. Many useful comments and suggestions 
from these meetings were incorporated into the 
final design of this analysis so that a typical farm 
situation is more closely approximated. 
Some of the major assumptions are: 
a. Labor: Rodale agronomists had recorded all 
field operations and their dates of application. These 
field operations were translated into hours per acre 
by using standard farm management conversion 
rates. These direct time requirements were in-
creased by 25% to allow for indirect labor require-
ments. The farmer had 250 available hours per 
month. If field operations exceeded this quantity, 
then help was hired to complete the task. It was 
assumed that part-time, skilled labor was available. 
Wage rates increased each year. 
b. Assets were valued at original cost minus 
accumulated depreciation (no asset appreciation). 
The fanner purchased new machinery each year at 
the rate of 15% of the current year's beginning 
asset value. The fanner made yearly building im-
provements at the rate of 6% of the current year's 
beginning asset value. 
c. Federal taxes were paid according to the 1988 
Tax Rate Schedule. Straight-line depreciation was 
used. 
The strength of this financial analysis stems from 
the detailed records of inputs and outputs that were 
kept by Rodale Research Center during the length 
of the trial. The analysis gives a clear picture of 
the good and bad years of the 1980s. 
One cautionary note is in order in regards to this 
analysis. The purpose of Rodale's Conversion Ex-
periment is primarily to enlarge the biological un-
derstanding of changes in the soil due to the transition 
from conventional to low-input agriculture (Har-
wood). The question arises as to whether or not it 94    October 1990  NJARE 
is appropriate to evaluate an experiment by farm 
profitability standards when profitability was never a 
major objective. In this case, the authors feel that the 
rotations followed in the experiment approximate 
what a farmer, had he or she been attempting to 
maximize profits, might have grown. Therefore, 
these results are presented with confidence. 
Results and Discussion 
Profitability 
Table 3 shows average profit for different time 
spans for the four scenarios. Profit is defined as 
the before-tax return to operator and family labor, 
management, and equity capital. Between 1981 and 
1989, the most-profitable scenario was the con-
ventional grain farm participating in the govern-
ment feed grain program, which averaged $39,193 
per year. This result is not surprising, given the 
high level of participation by farmers in this 
program during the 1980s (which indicates the 
program's financial attractiveness). The National 
Research Council noted in Alternative Agriculture 
that "when cash grain prices are supported far above 
the market level, many farmers would reduce their 
net farm income if they shifted from growing only 
price-supported crops, such as corn and soybeans, 
to legume-based rotations . . ." (p. 241). Gold-
stein and Young found similar advantages for con-
ventional wheat production over the low-input 
approach when support prices were used. 
The next most profitable scenario was the low-
input grain farmer who participated in the govern-
ment programs. As mentioned earlier, this scenario is 
not possible. The problem is cross-compliance 
regulations. This fanner raised wheat and barley 
several years for which the farm did not have a 
base. Low-input agriculture requires many different 
crops to be grown so that pests can be controlled and 
nutrients regenerated in the soil. Cross-
compliance regulations can seriously hamper the 
farmer's ability to select crops to accomplish these 
goals. Since the farmer had a corn base of 500 
acres, there was not any problem staying within 
that limitation for corn acreage. The base acreage 
was reduced each year, but it leveled out at 250 
acres. Increasing the corn-acreage base to its pre-
vious level would be difficult. 
A more-flexible farm program, as regards cross-
compliance, may benefit low-input farmers in the 
future. In addition, while the farmer cannot hay 
the set-aside acres, this land can be planted to crops 
that maintain the biological integrity of the low-
input rotation. 
The conventional grain farm, base scenario, av-
eraged $29,891, or approximately $2,300 more than 
the low-input farm, base scenario, which averaged 
$27,614. 
One criticism of the research that analyzes the 
profitability of low-input versus conventional sys-
tems is that the research is biased in favor of the 
low-input approach (Marten). To avoid such crit-
icism, the assumptions associated with this case 
study assumed a difficult transition for the low-
input farm operator. For example, the low-input 
farmer had to purchase hay equipment for $25,000 
in 1981. Also, hay prices were calculated at 75% 
of the lowest-priced hay category quoted by the 
Maryland Department of Agriculture. Straw prices 
were equally devalued. These devaluations may 
reflect lower-quality hay or a decline in prices if 
forage production increases as the low-input ap-
proach is more widely adapted. A low-input farmer 
who has resources or opportunities which mitigate 
the above assumptions would likely achieve higher 
profits. 
As mentioned in other literature, there is a cost 
of converting to the low-input approach (Dabbert 
and Madden). It takes time for the soil to develop 
the positive attributes associated with the low-input 
approach. Table 3 lists the average profit for 
1981-84 and 1985-89. These particular time spans 
were chosen to reflect a biological transition period 
of four years. A U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) study report suggests that four years of 
transition should be expected when converting from 
 
Table 3.    Measurements of Profitability, Liquidity, and Solvency for Low-Input and 
Conventional Scenarios (Dollars) 
  Average Annual Profit   
Current  Increase in
Liabilities Net Worth
Scenarios  1981-89  1981-84 1985-89 (12/31/89)  (1981-89)
Low-Input, base scenario  27,614  22,027  32,083    144,448  17,124 
Low-Input, govt. programs  32,464  17,790 44,202   1 10,039  50,533
Conventional, base scenario  29,891  39,769 21,990   124,118  15,444
Conventional, govt. programs  39,193  36,125 34,738   54,315  83,247Hanson, Johnson, Peters, and Janke 
conventional to low-input practices. While weather 
and grain prices can dramatically affect these av-
erages, the low-input base scenario averaged $10,000 
more per year in profit after the transition period, 
for an increase of 46%. This suggests that its av-
erage profit may equal or surpass the conventional 
base scenario's profit in future years as the tran-
sitional cost is amortized over more years. It is 
important to note that while the biological transi-
tion period might only be four years, this study 
shows that it will take more than five additional 
years to recoup those lost profits so that the farmer 
will be as well off as if no change had been made. 
In other words, the economic transition for this 
case study is at least twice as long as the biological 
transition. 
This increase in profit for the low-input farmer 
was directly related to the increase in average corn 
yields from 58.8 bushels per acre (1981-84) to 
104.4 bushels per acre (1985-89). By comparison, 
the conventional farm averaged 88.45 and 104.8 
bushels, respectively, for those time periods. 
The drop in average profits for both conventional 
scenarios during these periods is not indicative of a 
declining profitability for the conventional ap-
proach. Rather, the two conventional scenarios had 
relatively high yields in 1983 and 1984 and ben-
efited from the high prices of that period. Low grain 
prices in 1985, 1986, and 1987 seriously hurt the 
conventional base scenario. The conventional farmer 
in government programs was helped by large de-
ficiency payments during those years. 
Liquidity 
The liquidity of the farm is reflected in the changing 
level of current liabilities. All scenarios increased 
their current liabilities from zero on December 31, 
1980, to those numbers listed in Table 3. Problems 
with liquidity are directly related to the profit rank-
ings just discussed. 
The assumptions in this analysis required that 
all land, machinery, and building principal pay-
ments be honored. In addition, new machinery pur-
chases and building improvements were purchased 
annually at the rate of 15% and 6% of beginning 
inventories, respectively. While these rates could 
be high, it was felt that many whole-farm analyses 
ignore necessary capital replacement. It is con-
ceivable that these rates could be lowered by timely 
repairs and maintenance. 
As a result, current liabilities had to be increased 
in many years. This essentially amounted to trading 
long-term debt for short-term debt. In reality, fanners 
refinance their short-term debt into long-term 
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debt to alleviate cash-flow problems. However, it 
was felt that for purposes of comparison, any in-
crease in liabilities should be reflected in only one 
category. 
As mentioned, the problems with liquidity are 
largely a function of the study's assumptions and 
of the relative profits during this period. Another 
possible explanation is the farm crisis of the 1980s. 
The farm crisis was especially hard on the average-
sized family farm which these four scenarios closely 
approximate. 
Solvency 
Despite liquidity problems, Table 3 shows that all 
scenarios increased net worth over the nine years. 
The largest increase in net worth was achieved by 
the conventional farmer in the government pro-
gram. Income taxes, which affect net worth, were 
incorporated in this analysis to give a better picture of 
the financial situation. Because of changing tax 
laws and the considerable flexibility and variation 
in farmer tax practices, no attempt was made to 
maximize after-tax income by shifting expenses or 
revenues, income averaging, taking investment 
credit, using accelerated depreciation rates, and 
carrying back or over net operating losses. As a 
result, the rankings of net-worth increases are not 
the same as average profit rankings. The lower 
variability of profits on the low-input farms im-
proved their after-tax income relative to that of the 
conventional farms. 
The debt-to-asset ratios give another perspective 
on solvency. All scenarios began 1981 with a 22% 
debt-to-asset ratio. At the end of 1989, the low-
input and conventional scenarios participating in 
government programs had decreased their debt-to-
asset ratio to 21% and 18%, respectively. The con-
ventional base scenario's ratio remained the same 
and the low-input base scenario's ratio increased 
to 24%. None of these ratios are in the problem 
range. 
Risk 
Table 4 lists average annual profit, standard de-
viations of profit, and lower confidence limits of 
profits for the three scenarios (the low-input in gov-
ernment programs scenario is not included because 
of cross-compliance restrictions). The variation in 
profits is far greater for the two conventional sce-
narios than for the low-input base scenario. The 
two conventional farms had much higher and much 
lower annual profits than the low-input base sce-
nario. A risk-averse farmer might not choose the   
Table 4.    Average Annual Profits, Standard 
Deviations of Profits, and 75% Lower 
Confidence Limit of Profits for Three 
Scenarios, 1981-89 (Dollars) 
  Average     
  Annual  Standard Lower
Scenarios  Profit  Deviation Limit
Low-Input, base scenario  27,614  16,985 16,166
Conventional, base scenario 29,891 37,811 4,406
Conventional, government  39,193  24,416 12,777
programs       
conventional grain farm in the government program 
alternative, which a simple ranking of average an-
nual profits might indicate he or she would. 
Musser, Ohannesian, and Benson suggested a 
safety-first criterion to incorporate risk in farm 
management extension programs. In this method, 
the lower confidence limit of profit is equal to: Lt = 
EJ — KSj, where £( is the lower confidence limit of 
profits for activity i; E-t  is the average mean of 
profits for activity i; 5, is the standard deviation of 
profits for activity i; and K is the number of stan-
dard deviations required to satisfy the farmer that 
average profit in a given year will exceed Z,, (given a 
level of probability). If a fanner desires that average 
profit exceed Lf in three of four years (75% lower 
confidence limit), then K = 0.674 if a normal 
distribution is assumed. 
A farmer with this risk preference would choose 
the low-input scenario over the conventional alter-
natives. In three of four years, profit would exceed 
$16,166 (Table 4). The next-best alternative is the 
conventional government program scenario where 
profits would exceed $12,777 in three of four years. 
Because of the large differences in standard devia-
tions between the low-input and the two conven-
tional scenarios, increased risk avoidance only 
confirms the choice of the low-input alternative 
using this criterion. 
For those farmers who would use a relative-
variability criterion (coefficient of variation) to re-
duce risk, the low-input scenario is still the best 
choice; however, it is only slightly better than the 
conventional scenario in government programs. The 
coefficients of variation for the low-input base sce-
nario, conventional scenario participating in gov-
ernment programs, and conventional base scenario 
are 62%, 67%, and 126%, respectively. 
There are three major explanations for these dif-
ferences in profit variation. On average, one-third 
of gross farm income on the low-input farm came 
from sources other than the sale of corn or 'soy-
beans. Farms practicing rotations are generally 
considered less susceptible to profit variation (Hel- 
mers, Langemeier, and Atwood). In addition, the 
conventional scenarios purchased approximately 
$35,500 more in fertilizers and pesticides each year. 
This cost exacerbated financial problems by re-
ducing profits significantly during dry years when 
yields were low. On the other hand, the conven-
tional scenarios had large profits during 1983 and 
1984 because of high grain prices and good yields. 
Finally, farmers in government programs receive 
deficiency payments which help support profits in 
years of low prices. 
Analysis of Revenues and Expenses 
The following section compares revenues and ex-
penses for the low-input and conventional base sce-
narios. These differences result directly from the 
cultural practices outlined in this case study which 
are regional specific. For example, the farmers in 
the Mid-Atlantic region have access to hay and 
straw markets that other farmers might not have. 
However, comparisons can still be made with low-
input rotations in other regions. 
Table 5 lists several items that compare the op-
erations of the low-input base scenario with the 
conventional base scenario. The low-input's gross 
income was on average 19% lower each year than 
the conventional^ gross income. This reduction is 
due to lower corn and soybean acreages and be-
cause of the lower corn yields during the years of 
transition. The returns per acre of corn are high on 
the low-input farm, especially in the later years, 
but not all acres can be planted to corn as with the 
conventional farm. For example, in some years 
there were only 250 acres of corn to sell and other 
years 500 acres of corn and soybeans. While the 
hay or straw crops provided income, there was only 
one cutting, and under these cultural practices, yields 
were low. Also, while red clover/oat straw is an 
acceptable hay, it does not command high prices. 
Cash operating expenses were 26% lower for the 
low-input scenario. This is primarily due to the 
95% reduction in inorganic fertilizers and chemical 
pesticides for the low-input scenario. The low-
input scenario did not apply any pesticides over 
the nine years. Both the low-input and conventional 
scenarios received potash applications in 1989. Other 
than this potash addition, no other inorganic fer-
tilizers were added to the low-input scenario. The 
soils at the Rodale Research Center are high in 
phosphorus. While legumes can supply sufficient 
nitrogen, inorganic potash and phosphorus fertil-
izers might still be needed under a low-input re-
gime. 
Machinery costs for the low-input farm were 
higher than for the conventional farm. It was as- 
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Table 5.    A Comparison of Gross Income, Profit, and Factors of Production for the Low-
Input and Conventional Base Scenarios, 1981-89 
    Average/Yr. (1981-89)    % Difference,
Low-Input to
Item  Low- Input Conventional   Conventional
Gross income    $140,765  $174,433   -19 
Cash operating expense  99,715 133,922   -26
Depreciation  13,436 10,620   + 26
Profit  27,614 29,891  
o    o  
Fertilizer & crop chemicals    1,875 37,371   -95
Hired labor costs  3,096 2,426   + 28
Machinery purchases  17,770 11,719   + 52
Machinery repairs, fuel, and lubrication  12,862 10,081   + 28
Cash expense as a % of income 71.8% 80.9% -11
Interest (excluding land mortgage interest)    $10,745 $9,625   + 12
Interest on land mortgage  $25,200 $25,200   0
Total interest as a % of income    25.5% 20.0%   + 28
sumed that on December 31, 1980, there was not 
any hay equipment. As a result, the low-input farm 
had to purchase hay equipment costing approxi-
mately $25,000 in 1981. In addition, the low-input 
farmer had to make additional machinery purchases 
each year to maintain this hay equipment. Further, 
there were additional repairs, fuel, and lubrication 
costs associated with this machinery. A farmer con-
sidering this low-input rotation and who has ex-
isting hay equipment on the farm would make the 
transition easier. However, the assumptions in this 
analysis were made to dramatize additional ma-
chinery purchases that might have to be made when 
cultural practices are changed significantly. 
Hired labor costs were 28% higher for the low-
input scenario. This is not surprising because, for 
example, mechanical tillage requires more labor 
than spraying, and hay crops require more labor 
than corn. However, there is a mitigating factor 
against the notion that the low-input approach al-
ways requires more labor. The conventional farmer 
has extremely high labor requirements during certain 
times of the year because the cultural practices of 
corn and soybeans are similar. The low-input 
farmer, with more crops and less acreage of each, 
spreads these labor requirements over the growing 
season. For example, hay harvest comes at a time 
when the labor requirements for corn and soybeans 
are low. In other studies, Lockeretz reported that 
there were 15% higher labor requirements on bi-
ological farms. 
Interest payments, excluding the interest on the 
land mortgage, were 12% higher for the low-input 
farmer. The low-input farmer does not pay as much 
interest on the production loan because less is bor-
rowed. However, the low-input farmer has higher 
interest payments for machinery. In addition, be-
cause there were lower profits in the transition years, 
more interest was paid on carry-over current lia-
bilities. 
Total interest paid as a percent of gross income 
was 25.5% and 20.0% for the low-input and con-
ventional farmers, respectively. Ferguson suggests 
that when this ratio exceeds 16%, there could be 
financial problems. The relatively high level of this 
ratio for the low-input farmer accents the liquidity 
problems associated with the transitional costs (bi-
ological and resource adjustments) associated with 
the conversion from conventional methods. Overall, 
cash expenses as a percent of gross income were 
lower for the low-input farmer as compared to the 
conventional fanner (71.8% compared to 80.9%). 
Conclusions 
1. The conventional grain farm in the govern-
ment program is the most profitable scenario. 
The next most profitable scenario is the low-
input in the government program (ignoring cross-
compliance restrictions). The base scenarios for 
conventional and low-input are ranked third and 
fourth. 
2. Government programs reward the conven-
tional farmer with a good base acreage and yield. 
Unless the low-input farmer can plant rotational 
crops not covered by cross-compliance regulations, 
he or she is^not eligible to participate. It is likely 
that when moving from a conventional to a low-
input system, a farmer will plant less than the farm's 
base acreage for a particular program crop because 
of the inclusion of other crops in the rotation. Con-
sequently, if cross-compliance restrictions were re-
laxed, the benefits of government programs would 
be available to the low-input farmer to aid in the 98    October 1990  NJARE 
transition. If current restrictions are kept in place, 
however, the loss of revenue from government pro-
grams is a tremendous disincentive for conven-
tional farmers who are considering switching to a 
low-input approach. 
3. The low-input approach is advantageous for 
risk-averse farmers who use the safety-first crite-
rion. When average annual profits are adjusted to 
reflect risk avoidance, the low-input approach is 
the best choice. For those farmers who use a rel-
ative-variability criterion, the low-input approach is 
still advantageous, but only slightly so. Both 
approaches ignore the financial risk of cash-flow 
problems associated with the transition from a con-
ventional to a low-input system. 
4. Profits trend upward for the low-input sce-
nario. This confirms the existence of transitional 
costs that must be paid. Even though recent profit 
averages (1985-89) are now higher for the low-
input base scenario, overall averages (1981-89) are 
still less than the conventional base scenario. This 
indicates that the economic transitional period ex-
ceeds the biological transition period. If current 
trends continue (an admittedly difficult assumption 
to justify), overall average annual profits for the 
conventional and low-input base scenarios will be 
equal after eleven years. 
5. Without restructuring current debt, all sce-
narios faced cash-flow problems. All four scenarios 
increased their net worth; however, the largest in-
crease was achieved by the conventional farmer in 
the government program. 
6. The quality of the soil will determine, to a 
large extent, the future productivity of these agri-
cultural systems. This analysis does not directly 
factor in any differences in soil properties that may 
have occurred between the low-input and conven-
tional fields after nine years. For example, rapid 
water infiltration was observed in the low-input 
corn fields largely as a result of including legume 
green manure crops in this rotation (Rodale Re-
search Center). However, the increased profits of 
the low-input systems in the later years presumably 
reflect this investment in soil improvement. 
7. Profitability studies that focus on only a few 
years of data to compare conventional and low-
input systems significantly understate the potential 
profitability of the low-input approach. 
8. This study highlights the extreme cases of 
applying conventional (normal) amounts of pesti-
cides and inorganic chemicals versus their absence. It 
is likely that some intermediate level could achieve a 
higher level of profitability while still signifi-
cantly reducing chemical pollution. More research is 
needed to verify this proposition. 
9. The results of this study are regional and 
farm-system specific. Additional research is needed to 
compare the relative profitability of conventional and 
low-input farming systems in other regions of the 
United States. 
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